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If Landry is allowed to stand, it would mean that municipal and
parish governing bodies have a power possessed by no other officer or
administrative body, and may disregard the express mandate of the 1970
amendment to section 3306. As interpreted by the court, the challenged
statutory procedure permits a municipal or parish council to command
the levying of a special assessment when, in its own opinion, there is the
requisite benefit to the adjoining property owners. By sanctioning the
order allowing the levying of the special assessment, the court, in effect,
approved action taken without hearing, without evidence, without oral
argument, and without opportunity to learn the basis thereof. Since
such ex parte action was not deemed an abuse of the Parish Council's
power, some question arises over what the court would deem an abuse of
discretion or how this could be established in the absence of a hearing or
the opportunity to present evidence. The infirmities of this holding become even more apparent upon realization that the administrative
body's findings are not subject to general judicial review. The administrator's opinion is final upon this fundamental question of requisite benefits unless what the court denominates "manifest and palpable abuse of
power" can be shown to exist. Absent such a showing, the administrative body may alone be cognizant of the reasoning behind its final opinion to levy a special or local assessment. Such authority, however
beneficently exercised in one case, could amount to a finding by administrative fiat in another. Certainly, such authority is inconsistent with rational justice and invites the arbitrary exercise of power.
James MarshallJones, Jr.

FOURTH AMENDMENT REMEDIES IN CIVIL PROCEEDINGS

On June 2, 1975, two detectives of the Jefferson Parish Sheriffs Office visited the defendant adult book store to obtain information to support a request for a search warrant. An affidavit signed by the officers
described by name various sexual activities depicted in the books and
movies displayed by the store. However, the search warrant which was
subsequently issued lacked the specificity necessary to give sufficient guireview of administrative determinations could be predicated upon expanded notions of
manifest error rather than the substantial evidence or the "arbitrary and capricious" stand-

ards. Where an administrative agency is not within the Act, reliance may only be placed
upon the limits of procedural due process.

See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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dance to the officers conducting the seizure regarding which books and

movies were legally considered to be "pornographic."' This resulted in
the officers themselves making ad hoc obscenity determinations during
the seizure in deciding which of the materials on display were included
within the scope of the warrant.2 Over one year after the seizure, the
Parish of Jefferson filed a civil injunction suit to abate the nuisance of
obscenity alleged to exist at the store. The defendant's motion to suppress the evidence was denied by both the trial court and the court of
appeal. The Louisiana Supreme Court held that the evidence should be
suppressed because the seizure of printed matter violated first amendment freedoms and was therefore "unreasonable" under fourth amendment standards. 3 ParishofJefferson v. Bayou Landing Limited,Inc., 350

So. 2d 158 (La. 1977).
When confronted with the question of the constitutionality of police
procedures used to procure evidence in the course of an obscenity prosecution, courts should scrutinize such conduct in light of its effect upon4

the value of freedom of expression protected by the first amendment.

Methods used to regulate obscenity include seizures for evidence in the
context of both criminal and civil proceedings. 5 In order lawfully to
1. The search warrant described the objects intended for seizure as "'pornographic
' " Parish of Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Limited,
material to wit: Magazines, movies ...
Inc., 350 So. 2d 158, 160 (La. 1977). The issuing magistrate had failed to examine any of
the publications before signing the warrant but relied on the "conclusory assertions" of the
detectives that the publications were obscene. This was the fatal attribute of the warrant
condemned in Marcus v. Search Warrantsof Propertyat 104 East Tenth St., Kansas City,
Missouri, 367 U.S. 717, 732 (1961).
2. In addition to other miscellaneous items, some two hundred books and seventeen
movies were seized. Parish of Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Limited, Inc., 350 So. 2d 158,
161 (La. 1977). Consequently, the first amendment was violated by removing large quantities of printed materials from public circulation before the obscenity issue had been litigated. See A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964).
3. Even after deciding that the evidence should have been suppressed the court saw fit
to determine the constitutional validity of the injunction as amended by the court of appeal. The court found that it did not comport with constitutional requirements of specificity
and thus operated as a "prohibited prior restraint upon the right of free speech." Parish of
Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Limited, Inc., 350 So. 2d 158, 165 (La. 1977). In effect, both
the injunction and the procedure used to obtain the injunction were overturned.
4. See Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 504 (1973); United States v. Santiago, 424 F.2d
1047, 1048 (1st Cir. 1970); Burnett, Obscenity. Search andSeizure andthe FirstAmendment,
51 DENVER L.J. 41 (1974).
5. Both Marcus v. Search Warrants of Property at 104 East Tenth St., Kansas City,
Missouri,367 U.S. 717 (1961) and A Quantity of Copies ofBooks v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205
(1964), concerned statutes in the nature of in rem proceedings which directed the police to
seize obscene material for destruction by burning or otherwise. Roaden v. Kentucky, 413
U.S. 504 (1973) and Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483 (1973), concerned seizures for evi-
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wield the search and seizure power when the object of the seizure is a
book, movie, or other medium of human expression potentially within
the parameters of the first amendment, the state must guarantee that the
seizure does not effect a restraint upon constitutionally protected (.e.,
non-obscene) material. 6 Whether the state should be required to forego
the use of evidence obtained through an abuse of the seizure power has
been a continuing source of controversy among fourth amendment
scholars. 7
In circumscribing the search and seizure power, the fourth amendment does not provide for the imposition of a specific sanction or remedy
in the event of a violation. 8 Suppression of the evidence as a tool for
effectuating the guarantees of the fourth amendment had its genesis in
the landmark case of Boyd v. United States9 in 1886, but it was not until
Mapp v. Ohio1 ° in 1961 that the so-called exclusionary rule remedy was
deemed to be inherent in the constitutional framework of search and
seizure. However, application of such a drastic remedy has been tempered by the refusal of the current United States Supreme Court to make
exclusion of the evidence the automatic result of all illegal searches and
seizures.II Recent decisions indicate that the litigation must involve the
dence incident to arrests for violation of a criminal obscenity statute. In the instant case,
the seizure for evidence preceded a civil action for injunctive relief. See also Kingsley
Books, Inc., v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 441 (1957).
6. In Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), the Court held that obscenity is not
within the area of constitutionally protected freedom of speech or press.
7. As Justice Blackmun observed in United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976),
"(t]he debate within the Court on the exclusionary rule has always been a warm one." See
Foote, Tort Remediesfor Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L. REV. 493
(1955); Geller, Enforcing the Fourth Amendment.- The Exclusionary Rule and Its
Alternatives, 1975 WASH. U. L. Q. 621; Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26
STAN. L. REv. 1027 (1974); Oaks,
U. CHI. L. REV. 665 (1970).

Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37

8. "While the existence of a constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches
and seizures is beyond question, the Constitution is silent concerning remedies in the event
of a breach." Note, Reason and the Fourth Amendment-The Burger Court and the Exclusionary Rule, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 139, 140 (1977). Historically, the admissibility of the

evidence was not affected by the fact that it was unlawfully seized. Relief in the form of a
civil action for trespass was available against the officials committing the impropriety.
Only later did exclusion of the evidence emerge as the preferred remedy in criminal cases.
9. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
10. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See Note, Reason and the Fourth Amendment-The Burger
Court and the Exclusionary Rule, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 139 (1977).
11. In construing the reach of the fourth amendment, some earlier United States
Supreme Court cases made the claim that fourth amendment "protection reached all alike,
whether accused of crime or not." Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914). See
also Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920). However, the
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potential for a criminal penalty, or something equivalent thereto in the
context of a civil proceeding, in order to justify invoking the rule. 12 In
One Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 13 the state asserted that a fourth

amendment violation in the course of securing evidence for a civil forfeiture proceeding did not warrant suppression of that evidence at trial.
The Court saw little difference between depriving an accused of his

property or subjecting him to a fine or incarceration and for this reason
characterized a forfeiture as essentially "criminal in nature" before insisting upon the applicability of the exclusionary remedy. Thus the
Court sought to classify the proceeding and determine the necessity for
exclusion by analyzing the actual consequences of an adverse judgment
14
upon the accused.
exclusionary rule was never explicitly referred to as the universal means by which this
fourth amendment protection would be realized. Until 1976, the Court had not considered
the issue of exclusionary rule applicability to civil cases (see notes 17-19 and accompanying
text, infra). See Note, Application ofthe FourthAmendment's Searchesand Seizures Clause
in Ci'il,4ctions,8 N.E.L. REV. 67 (1972).
12. The most recent and significant statement of the current Court's view of the exclusionary rule is United States v. Calandra,414 U.S. 338 (1974). The majority opinion declared that "[d]espite its broad deterrent purpose, the exclusionary rule has never been
interpreted to proscribe the use of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all
persons. As with any remedial device, the application of the rule has been restricted to
those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served. The balancing process implicit in this approach is expressed in the contours of the standing requirement. Thus, standing to invoke the exclusionary rule has been confined to situations
where the government seeks to use such evidence to incriminate the victim of the unlawful
search [citations omitted]. This standing rule is premised on a recognition that the need
for deterrence and hence the rationale for excluding the evidence are strongest when the
government's unlawful conduct would result in imposition of a criminal sanction on the
victim of the search." Id. at 347-48.
13. 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
14. Justice Goldberg stated that "a forfeiture proceeding is quasi-criminal in character.
Its object, like a criminal proceeding, is to penalize for the commission of an offense against
the law." Id. at 700. One could argue that the same observation could be made about the
injunction suit of the instant case pursuant to Title 13, Section 4711 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes (1960). An injunction restraining the defendant book store from conducting
business would be equally onerous. However, this logic would seem to be implicitly rejected in United States v. Janis,428 U.S. 433 (1976) (see text at note 17, infra). In Janis,
the defendant's motion to suppress illegally seized evidence in a civil tax proceeding was
denied; an adverse judgment at trial would have subjected him to a $90,000 penalty. In
both Janis and United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (see note 12, supra), the
Court attached special significance to the fact that the proceeding did not concern the imposition of a criminal sanction. Presumably, this means incarceration, for the size of the
penalty in Janis would seem to exclude any other interpretation. It can not be seriously
doubted, however, that depending upon the life of the injunction or the size of the fine,
either could be viewed as being commensurate with a criminal penalty. It seems anoma-
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Many lower courts have freely extrapolated from the Mapp decision
the concept of applying the exclusionary rule to the fruits of all search
and seizure violations,' 5 while others have restricted its use to circumstances identical to those of Mapp-a criminal prosecution where the
government was responsible for the illegal seizure. 16 In 1976, the Court
addressed the question whether suppressing evidence was appropriate in
some civil proceedings. In United States v. Janis,'7 the Los Angeles police seized certain wagering records and cash from a suspected bookmaker. The motion to suppress the evidence in the criminal prosecution
was granted because of the warrant's constitutional defects. The wagering records were then supplied to the Internal Revenue Service which
levied upon the cash seized in partial satisfaction of federal wagering
excise taxes. Since the assessment was based upon evidence procured
through an infringement of fourth amendment rights, the lower courts
ordered the evidence suppressed in the civil proceeding.18 The Supreme
Court reversed, with Justice Blackmun observing that "[iln the complex
and turbulent history of the rule, the Court never has applied it to exlous to use this reasoning in order to extend the reach of the exclusionary rule from criminal cases to civil forfeiture cases, and then to ignore it when the victim of a massive civil
penalty contends that the evidence should have been suppressed. See also Honeycutt v.
Aetna Ins. Co., 510 F.2d 340 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975).
15. See Del Presto v. Del Presto, 92 N.J. Super. 305, 223 A.2d 217 (1966); Williams v.
Williams, 8 Ohio Misc. 156, 221 N.E.2d 622 (1966). For civil cases with criminal aspects,
see United States v. Bland, 261 F. Supp. 180 (N.D. Ohio, 1966); Carson v. State, 221 Ga.
299, 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965); Kassner v. Fremont Mutual Insurance Co., 47 Mich. App. 264,
209 N.W.2d 490 (1973).
16. See Honeycutt v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 F.2d 340 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
1011 (1975); NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 915 (1970); Sackler v. Sackler, 15 N.Y.2d 40, 203 N.E.2d 481 (1964). In
Honeycutt, the defendant insurance company sought to introduce evidence obtained by fire
department officials in warrantless searches of the plaintiff"s house after a recent fire. The
defendant refused to pay the insurance claim in the belief that Honeycutt had set the fires
himself, a supposition substantiated by the results of the fire department investigation.
Honeycutt contended that the fruits of the unlawful intrusion were inadmissible, but the
court ruled otherwise while acknowledging the dearth of precedent upon which to rely.
The court reasoned a fortiori from United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1973), where
the exclusionary rule was held inapplicable to grand jury proceedings, and One Plymouth
Sedan v. Pennsylvania,380 U.S. 693 (1965), where it was deemed necessary to classify a
civil forfeiture proceeding as criminal to permit the exclusionary rule to be invoked. See
also Note, TheApplicability of the ExclusionaryRule to Civil Cases, 19 BAYLOR L. REV. 263
(1967).
17. 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
18. Janis v. United States, 73-1 CCH U.S. Tax Cas., 16,083, at 81, 392 (1973), aff'd,
U.S. Ct. of App. (9th Cir.) (by unpublished memorandum).
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dude evidence from a civil proceeding, federal or state." 19 Nevertheless,
the Court confined its holding in Janis to the situation where the sovereign attempting to introduce the evidence at trial was not the sovereign
who had obtained the evidence through an abuse of the seizure power.
The validity of this distinction between intersovereign and intrasovereign violations may appear to be superficial from the viewpoint of the
defendant, yet the Court believed it to be a pivotal factor in assessing the
necessity for the exclusionary remedy. Since the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter those responsible for upholding the law from acting outside of the law in the process, the punishment of exclusion should
operate only against the agents of the sovereign committing the violation. The deterrent effect is thus attenuated in an intersovereign situation
such as Janis and the attenuation is further augmented where the proceeding is one to enforce merely the civil law of the other sovereign.
There is a balancing process therefore inherent in the application of the
rule. The detriment to law enforcement and society in general resulting
from exclusion of reliable evidence must be considered in light of the
probability of deterrence and nature of the sanction to be imposed upon
the defendant. It is unclear whether this rationale will support exclusion
under the circumstances of the instant case where the sovereign guilty of
a fourth amendment breach seeks to use the evidence in a civil proceeding.
The chief Supreme Court cases dealing with state regulation of obscenity include both civil and criminal prosecutions. In two civil forfeiture proceedings, Marcus v. Search Warrants of Property20 and A
Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas,2 1 the constitutional analysis
turned upon findings of a fourteenth amendment due process violation
in the event that first amendment rights had in any way been impaired
by the methods used to seize the allegedly obscene material. 22 The
19. 428 U.S. at 447.
20. Marcus v. Search Warrants of Property at 104 East Tenth St., Kansas City, Missouri, 367 U.S. 717 (1961).
21. 378 U.S. 205 (1964).
22. In Marcus . Search Warrants of Property at 104 East Tenth St., Kansas City,
Missouri, 367 U.S. 717 (1961), the issuing magistrate did not scrutinize the material and
issued an overly broad warrant which allowed the seizing officers to make spontaneous
obscenity determinations during the seizure. Justice Brennan eloquently expounded upon
the history of governmental search and seizure abuses but never referred to the fourth
amendment as the controlling principle for condemning the procedure employed by Missouri. The thrust of the Court's rationale was directed toward the protection of free speech
assured against state abridgement by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The Court iterated that for search and seizure purposes printed material must be treated
differently from other objects of seizure since the added concern is to avoid suppression of
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Court did not consider the seizures in terms of their evidentiary ramifica-

tions and an exclusionary remedy via the Mapp rationale, 23 for in
neither Marcus nor Quantity was there a discussion of fourth amendment violations and applicable remedies. 24 Instead, the Court expressed

concern that the seizure for evidence in the forfeiture action was so massive that it operated as an ex parte judgment which took printed matter
out of circulation without a previous adversary hearing on its alleged
obscenity. Thus, the statutory procedure as applied "lacked the safeguards which due process demands to assure non-obscene material the
constitutional protection to which it is entitled." 25 As a result, the lower
court judgments based on the illegal seizure were vacated.
non-obscene publications entitled to constitutional immunity. The Court then recognized
that Missouri's use of the search and seizure power to suppress obscene publications "involved abuses inimical to protected expression". Id. at 730. The actual holding of
Marcus was clearly framed in terms of the fourteenth amendment in that the court declared that the due process violation-non-obscene material had not received the constitutional protection to which entitled-had "infected the proceedings." Id. at 738. A
"strikingly similar" statute was involved in .4 Quantity of Copies a/Books v. Kansas, 378
U.S. 205 (1964). However, in an attempt to comply with Marcus, the district attorney
showed several books to the issuing magistrate and the warrant itself was limited to thirtyone named titles. Nevertheless, over seventeen hundred books were seized before an adversary hearing was held on the obscenity question. Justice Brennan, again writing for the
majority, stated that "[a] seizure of all copies of named titles is indeed more repressive than
an injunction prohibiting further sale of the books." Id. at 210.
23. See notes 8-10 supra,and accompanying text. A concurring opinion in Marcus by
Justices Black and Douglas, however, pointed out that a similar result could be reached
under the newly formulated exclusionary rule, 367 U.S. 717, 738 (1961). Obviously, their
broad conception of the rule was not held by the majority who chose to base their decision
to vacate the judgment on the due process violation. In One Plymouth Sedan v.
Pennsylvania,380 U.S. 693 (1965), a civil forfeiture proceeding like Marcus and Quantity,
the exclusionary rule was held applicable because the judgment's functional effect would
have been similar to a criminal sanction. If this argument had been forwarded in Marcus,
decided the same day as Mapp, the exclusionary rule would conceivably have been utilized. This clearly would have signified that the rule was intended to apply in criminal or
civil proceedings whenever the government attempted to deprive an individual of liberty or
property after violating his fourth amendment rights.
24. In A Quantity ofCopies ofBooks v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964), the Court explicitly stated that it did not find it necessary to pass on the defendant's contention that his
right against unreasonable search and seizure had been violated. Id. at 209 n.2. In an
effort to maintain continuity with the decision in Marcus,the Court ruled that a due process violation had "infected the proceeding." Id at 213. Simply stated, the Court declared
that it would not condone the trammeling of first amendment rights by state officials zealous to act against obscene material.
25. Marcus v. Search Warrants of Property at 104 East Tenth St., Kansas City, Missouri, 367 U.S. 717, 731 (1961).
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In Roaden v. Kentucky, 26 the Court had occasion to examine more
explicitly the applicability of fourth amendment search and seizure doctrine to obscenity cases, but in the context of a criminal prosecution.
Chief Justice Burger explained the process for judging the constitutional
validity of a seizure of printed matter as incorporating first amendment
requirements in satisfaction of fourth amendment standards of reasonableness. Any seizure that failed to "hurdle" the reasonableness standard
was likely to render the evidence inadmissible. 27 Resort to the fourth
amendment rather than the fourteenth and the allusions to admissibility
of the evidence was appropriate here because the criminal law of search
and seizure is based squarely upon fourth amendment principles rather
than due process grounds. The only unique feature of Roaden was that
the object of the seizure was conceivably within the penumbra of first
amendment protection.
In the instant case the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision to suppress unconstitutionally seized evidence in a civil injunction proceeding
presents a curious mixture of the rationales of these past cases. Justice
Dixon began the inquiry by asking: "(1) Are the constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable search and seizure applicable to this proceeding, and (2) If so, did the seizure of the materials pursuant to the warrant
comport with constitutional requirements. '28 Thus, the initial portion
of the opinion is devoted to establishing the fact that the circumstances
gave rise to a fourth amendment question. The court relied on Camara
v. Municpal Court29 and See v. City of Seattle,30 along with Marcus and
Quantity, to support the proposition that the type of proceeding is not
dispositive of fourth amendment rights. However, Camara and See do
not deal with the admissibility of evidence even though they may extend
the reach of the fourth amendment to some civil proceedings (Ze., where
the government is a party to the search). 3 1 Their importance lies in their
treatment of the fourth amendment as the delimiter of governmental interference with individual privacy regardless of the purpose of the inves26. 413 U.S. 504 (1973).
27. See Lee Art Theater v. Virginia, 392 U.S. 636 (1968).
28. 350 So. 2d at 161.
29. Camara v. Municipal Court of the City and County of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523
(1967).
30. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
31. The plaintiffs in Camara v. Municipal Court of the City and County of San
Francisco,387 U.S. 523 (1967), and See v. City ofSeattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), sought to
enjoin criminal prosecution against them for refusal to permit warrantless entry of city
health inspectors. The cases are not precedent for suppression of the evidence in a civil
proceeding.
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tigation. 32 After citing Marcus and Camara for the premise of fourth
amendment applicability to civil proceedings, the court analogized from
the fourth amendment analyses of other obscenity cases similar to
Marcus, particularly Roaden despite its criminal law context, to conclude that the defendant's remedy was suppression of the evidence. Reliance on these cases thus led the court to grant the same remedy for a
fourth amendment violation in an injunction suit as in a criminal prosecution.
The court did not employ exclusionary rule language or reasoning
from exclusionary rule cases. The opinion nevertheless embraces a
fourth amendment exclusionary remedy instead of concluding that the
seizure had violated due process of law in its denial of constitutional
protection to non-obscene material. Although the fourth amendment
clearly applies to some civil proceedings, 33 the fact remains that the
United States Supreme Court has never suppressed the evidence in a
civil case as a result of a fourth amendment violation. The decisions in
both Marcus and Quantity, as in Roaden, noted the peculiar first amendment ramifications of a seizure of printed matter. Notwithstanding the
fact that a seizure was involved in each, the concern of the first two cases
was to assure that the procedure employed to regulate obscenity comported with constitutional requirements of due process. Essentially, the
Court struck down seizures of printed matter before the issue of its constitutional protection under the first amendment had been fairly determined. The Court obviously realized that it could reach a result similar
to exclusion in civil proceedings under due process grounds without having to broaden the exclusionary remedy to include all situations involving an illegal seizure. In Roaden the identical issues were decided on
different grounds, the Court preferring to base its opinion on classical
fourth amendment doctrine relating to the reasonableness of the
34
seizure.
32. In Camara v. Municival Court of the City and County of San Francisco,387 U.S.
523 (1967), the Court stated: "The basic purpose of this Amendment, as recognized in
countless decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals
against arbitrary invasion by government officials." Id. at 528. See also Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643, 650-57 (1961); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949); Note, 30 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 133 (1973). The Louisiana Supreme Court's discussion of the fourth amendment in Bayou Landing did not distinguish between governmental and non-governmental
searches and seizures.
33. See notes 28-32, supra, and accompanying text.
34. In leller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483 (1973), the defendant, in reliance on Quantity
and Marcus,contended that the seizure of a film without a prior adversary hearing violated
the fourteenth amendment. The fourth amendment approach of Roaden was not employed since the defendant in Heller had neglected to file a motion to suppress the evi-

19781

NOTES

The only relevance of Roaden to the circumstances of the instant
case is its discussion of the first amendment protection to be accorded
printed matter. The court in Bayou Landing apparently adopted
Roaden's fourth amendment approach and in so doing endorsed a fourth
amendment remedy whose applicability to civil proceedings is open to
question. Justice Dixon's inquiry to determine whether the seizure was
unreasonable by established constitutional standards included a succinct
examination of the interplay of fourth and first amendment rights. The
seizure was found unreasonable because it amounted to a restraint of
printed matter not yet judicially determined to be obscene. However,
the court failed to consider the problem of which remedies were then
available, and as a matter of reflex suppressed the evidence. Thus, the
dual reliance on Camaraand Marcus for fourth amendment precedent
in the area of civil proceedings and on Roaden for gauging the unreasonableness of the seizure and, presumably, the admissibility of the evidence, enabled the court to reach its conclusion. The entire issue of
fourth amendment remedies was avoided by suppressing the evidence
immediately upon finding a deviation from fourth amendment principles.
It may well be the view of the current Louisiana Supreme Court
that exclusion should be the remedy for any fourth amendment violation
involving agents of the government. The policy of deterrence would be
thus served without resort to an arbitrary distinction between civil and
criminal proceedings. Where the ultimate effect upon the defendant, be
it incarceration or enjoining him from conducting his livelihood, is severe enough to balance the scales in favor of exclusion, there should be
no hesitancy to invoke the remedy. However, since the opinion does not
afford any guidelines, there is the danger that it will be cited as precedent
for excluding evidence whenever there is an illegal seizure without any
consideration of government involvement or nature and severity of the
penalty resulting from a judgment adverse to the aggrieved party. 35 To
dence.. The Court by its extensive discussion recognized the legitimacy of a due process
claim separate and apart from any fourth amendment issue that the defendant had failed to
raise. Under Heller and Roaden, then, it appears that a criminal defendant may oppose a
seizure on either fourth amendment or due process grounds. A remedy is available in each
case if there has been unconstitutional state action. However, in civil litigation, under the
authority of United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976), a plea for relief under the fourth
amendment, as in Bayou Landing, may be met with procedural and substantive obstacles
that a due process claim would avoid.
35. It is important to note the inconsistency between Janis and Calandraon the one
hand, and One Plymouth Sedan on the other. The Warren Court in One Plymouth Sedan
emphasized the actual penalty to be suffered by the defendant irrespective of any technical
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this extent, clarification in this area of the law is essential.
Mark B Meyers

MATERNAL PREFERENCE AND THE DOUBLE BURDEN:
BEST INTEREST OF WHOM?

Three years after the plaintiff and the defendant were married, the
plaintiff was granted a separation from bed and board based on abandonment. He agreed to an award of custody of his eighteen-month-old
daughter to the defendant. After a year and sixty days from the judgment of separation, the defendant was awarded a divorce, but was denied custody of her child after a showing that she had been living with
another man in the presence of the child for four months. Three months
later, after the defendant married her lover, she brought suit and was
granted custody by the trial court. The Third Circuit Court of Appeal
affirmed, and held that the mother was not required to meet the "double
burden" rule and that under the maternal preference rule she was entitled to custody. Bushnell v. Bushnell, 348 So. 2d 1315 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1977).
Louisiana Civil Code articles 146 and 157 respectively control child
custody awards pending suit for separation or divorce l and after suit for
separation or divorce. 2 Article 146 dictates that provisional custody
labeling of the proceeding as civil or criminal. A lynchpin of the Janis and Calandra
decisions of the Burger Court was that the purpose of deterrence for which the exclusionary
rule was formulated is not sufficiently enhanced to overcome the need to permit the introduction of otherwise trustworthy evidence where the government's abuse of the seizure
power against a defendant would result merely in a civil penalty. On the whole, the view
espoused in One Plymouth Sedan is far less predictable but exceedingly more just. See
note 14, supra.
1. LA. CIv. CODE art. 146:
If there are children of the marriage, whose provisional keeping is claimed by both
husband and wife, the suit being yet pending and undecided, it shall be granted to the
wife, whether plaintiff or defendant; unless there should be strong reasons to deprive
her of it, either in whole or in part, the decision whereof is left to the discretion of the
judge.
2. LA. CIV. CODE art. 157 (as it appeared prior to its amendment by Act 48 of 1977):
In all cases of separation and of divorce the children shall be placed under the care of
the party who shall have obtained the separation or divorce unless the judge shall, for
the greater advantage of the children, order that some or all of them shall be entrusted

